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BUDGET MANAGEMENT AS ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT:
Some Macro, Micro, Growth, Allocational, Structural 
and Efficiency Concerns
By Reginald Herbold Green
On a cloth untrue
With a twisted cue
And elliptical billiard balls.
- Gilbert and Sullivan
Budget procedures are of critical importance. They should be 
related to programme goals and objectives...not used as 
substitutes for goals... They should be used to eliminate or 
reduce the bad side effects of a given policy, achieve cost 
efficiency...emphasise transparency, simplicity, speed and 
flexibility in programme formulation and execution.
- Budgeting and Planning for 
Development, 1976 UN Expert Group Report
Public spending determines the availability of [physical and 
human] infrastructure...allocational influence is equally 
pervasive... Therefore, the government budget has a major 
impact because of its size and because for some goods and 
services it is the only, or the dominant, supplier... This is 
in addition to the overall macro economic effects of the budget 
[and] additional to specific policy uses of the budget...
- Bank of Tanzania, 1980-81 
Economic Survey
All, all of a piece throughout;.... 
Thy wars brought nothing about;
Thy lovers were all untrue.
- Bryden
Public Expenditure, Budgets and Policy
One model of budget policy is reducing expenditure, eliminating deficits, and 
ensuring that all expenditure is within initial estimates and properly 
authorised/documented. This is the traditional - especially traditional 
colonial - budget paradigm; and one which has had a rebirth in post 1979 
conditions of extreme resource scarcity and economic imbalance.
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That it is a rather limited model with tunnel vision ha3 been demonstrated 
many times. What is relevant here is that it does have clear policy and 
management assumptions. First, that public expenditure crowds out private and 
is basically amenity expenditure allowable if and only if 'surplus' private 
sector production provides enough tax revenue to support it. Second, that 
public sector borrowing (or at least public sector borrowing from banks and/or 
for recurrent expenditure) leads to domestic resource misallocation ('crowding 
out') and imbalance (inflation) and to external resource misallocation (public 
consumption imports) and imbalance (Current Account Deficit). Third, that 
holding to initial spending estimates and ensuring proper 
documentation/authorisation ensures efficient use of resources and (perhaps 
more critical in this model) averts overspending. To the extent these 
assumptions are correct (which is not negligible even if arguably far from
total) the traditional paradigm is an economic management strategy.
A somewhat different model is of the Budget and Budgetary process as a mass of 
micro data, procedures, estimates, monitoring and evaluation (and political 
economically of bureaucratic, political, interest group and sub-class 
pressures and patterns of influence/control). This too - beyond its
functional and technical aspects - implicitly incorporates an economic
management model. However, in contrast to the first, it is basically a micro 
or (when it encompasses public revenue and expenditure as a whole) sectoral, 
not a macro, one.
A counter model is that of budgeting as blind guessing of unknown flows of
resources pushed by ill understood policy instruments in uncertain directions
over a contextual surface whose topology is badly mapped. Most comparisons of 
initially estimated to actual ex post revenue and expenditure, of policy 
targets and results and of programme output intentions and actuals suggest 
this vision has more than a little truth. From that perhaps two lessons can 
be drawn: management via the public finance process is neither conceptually
nor empirically a hard science nor one in which general principles can be 
assumed to override contexts (e.g. "animal spirits of entrepreneurs" 
including public sector ones) or exogenous shocks (e.g import capacity falls
whose impact on production and revenue can wash out most or all countervailing
management efforts in small, open economies); second, one critical element in 
management is reducing the degree of and increasing the flexibility in 
response to uncertainty, i.e. being less unable to posit the
- 3 -
allocational-revenue-production impact of a tax or subsidy and more able to 
determine rapidly if they are different from those intended as a first step 
toward taking corrective action.
It is certainly true that in Sub-Saharan Africa today public finance - as 
viewed from the perspective of almost any model - is a disaster area. Real 
cuts (e.g. over two thirds in Nigerian and Ivoirian capital budgets over 
1983-85; over 25í per capita in basic public services in Tanzania over 
1979-1985); massive recurrent deficits even in states which previously had 
long runs of recurrent surpluses; increased uncertainty as to actual results 
(in narrow budget balance and broader economic policy impact terms); day to 
day crisis management expedients overwhelming longer term, subtler, more 
analytical management efforts and instruments. In this public finance is not 
unique - SSA since 1979 has been and basically continues to be gripped by a 
set of interlocking exogenous and endogenous economic malaise, and is far from 
achieving stabilisation let alone recovery and reconstruction. Indeed, public 
finance - except in certain extreme cases - remains one of the more functional 
public policy areas and one which, however unexaminedly or even perversely, 
does have major economic management impact.
For the purposes of this paper the focus of attention is on central government 
budget/budgetary processes (recurrent and capital including local government 
and pulic enterprise elements included in the central budget). However, the 
analysis also (in certain respects perhaps even more) applies to consolidated 
public sector revenue/expenditure patterns and policies. These are not 
considered in detail here partly because consolidated public sector budgets 
are not, in practice, used as economic management frames in SSA (however 
desirable that may be) and because the production/surplus generation roles of 
public enterprises broaden the scope of the relevant management issues well 
beyond the coverage practicable in a short paper.
Why Does It Matter?
Why should budget management - especially in SSA - be viewed as central to 
economic management?
First, the central government budget is the largest single bloc of expenditure
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(and especially of expenditure subject to public managerial and policy 
control). In general it is between 20 and 30? of total national expenditure 
(and 25 to 40? of monetarised gross domestic product)'. The point of special 
significance in SSA is not that this share is high by global standards. 
Excluding transfer payments SSA government budgets are about average in global 
terms as a share of GDP, and including them well below average. Rather it is 
that household produced and consumed consumption is a higher share in SSA than 
elsewhere and is singularly difficult to subject to policy controls and that 
monetised expenditure is less and less predictably manageable than in most 
other economies. Similarly on the revenue side the budgetary 'take' 
significantly affects disposable incomes and therefore household and
enterprise command over non-public sector goods and services.
Second, because - necessarily - both budgetary revenue and expenditure come 
from specific sectoral and functional and geographic sources and are allocated 
to equally specific uses. Therefore, they affect not simply overall levels
and public/private makeup of supply and demand but also its locational, 
sectoral and functional (or interest group or sub-class) makeup.
Third, in many sectors the government is the only plausible, the only actual 
or the dominant supplier of goods/services. Law and order is not the only 
example of the former nor health/education/pure water of the second and third. 
In practice a broad range of economic infrastructure goods (e.g. roads, 
bridges, electricity) and services (e.g. agricultural research and extension) 
are - under SSA conditions - either government (public sector) supplied or 
very limited in scope and access.
Fourth, the pattern of large chunks of private sector production and
consumption is significantly influenced by policies usually operated in 
conjunction with the budget even if their primary purpose is not the getting 
or spending of state revenue. For example grower prices (and subsidies to 
support or taxes effectively reducing them) do influence which crops are 
emphasised and how marketing is carried out even if - taken alone - their 
impact on overall output is more problematic. Similarly protection, exchange 
control, export subsidy and related measures (and business views as to their 
stability and effectiveness) do influence what goods can be/are produced and 
whether they are directed to domestic or export markets (or both and in what 
proportions) and through which official, private, parallel or illicit
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marketing channels.
By and large government budgets and budgetary processes cannot avoid having 
these impacts. There is no real choice of cutting budget size, allocation and 
incentive/disincentive influences down enough to make them secondary in 
relation to economic events and therefore to economic management. Even if 
there were such a possibility it is not evident that such a course would be 
managerially efficient. Budgetary processes (whatever their limitations) do 
have greater coordination, more coherence and consistency checks, more 
efficiency tests (in respect to a variety of objectives), more transparency 
and a stronger tradition of serious analysis than most other political 
economic policy processes in SSA. This is not an argument for ’an imperial 
budget' taking over all policy and management issues, but it is one for making 
use of the economic impact and overall processual coherence of national 
budgets explicitly in economic management.
Macro Economic Levels and Balances - Domestic
The budget is the major managerial tool available to SSA states to alter macro 
economic levels of production and of demand as well as of macro economic 
balance. This is a multi-faceted area in which contexts and time frames are 
critical.
e.g. in the context of excess capacity, an import constraint on production, a 
very high import content in investment and falling real household and public 
sector per capita consumption a prudent medium term stabilisation/recovery 
strategy may be to reduce fixed investment (and thus future potential output) 
in order to allow increased growth of actual output (by increasing capacity 
utilisation) and to target savings at the true (net of indirect as well as 
direct import component) domestic component of fixed capital formation. If 
successful such a macro economic strategy stabilises (and balances) while 
buying time to articulate and secure the resources to implement a longer term 
capacity raising strategy. In fact the context and constraints posited apply 
to a majority of SSA economies so that a serious reexamination of the medium 
term efficiency of raising potential (but unuseable) capacity at the expense 
of achievable output is needed. Budgetarily such a shift would imply lower 
real budget allocations to capital and higher to recurrent. On the recurrent
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deficit closing/borrowing requirement reduction front it would imply using the 
fiscal dividend from higher output and consumption and raising taxes/fees 
plus cutting fixed investment rather more than cutting real service levels or 
(in most cases) public sector real wages and (less uniformly) salaries. This 
would probably not raise savings much but it would reduce public sector 
borrowing (implicitly largely by reducing private sector savings) which - 
together with lower demand for construction - would tend to reduce 
inflationary pressures.
One branch of macro economic management is concerned with short, medium and 
long term increases in actual output and in potential output growth. (As 
illustrated, the two may diverge in the short or medium term but in the longer 
term sustained actual output growth does require parallel capacity growth.) 
The total size of the budget - both on expenditure and on revenue accounts - 
is a major element in such management. So are certain policies subsumed in 
the totals including wages, salaries, producer prices (especially if 
statutorily or less directly) have major spread effects on other prices and 
incomes. So are broad measures effecting use of scarce and plentiful (e.g. 
unskilled labour, in some cases underutilised land) resources and of raising 
productivity (e.g. by research and extension in agriculture, construction, 
small scale industry, by education and improvement of health/nutrition 
levels).
Another branch of macro economic management is concerned with overall balances 
of supply and demand - in practice with avoiding the stigmata of severe 
imbalance: higher rates of inflation and unsustainable levels of current
account external deficits. (In principle the reverse imbalances characterised 
by widespread capacity utilisation together with low inflation and overall 
external balance surpluses would call for managerial correction just as 
urgently. Perhaps unfortunately, that is not the actual set of problems 
confronting budget managers in SSA today.) The overall budget level 
considerations and the broad (e.g. wage policy) ones apply here too - but in a 
direct opposite to that in terms of raising output or capacity. The 
scarce/plentiful resource tradeoffs and productivity raising aspects apply in 
the same direction (in general each would reduce imbalance by raising supply) 
albeit less strongly since imbalance macro management usually has to operate 
over a shorter time frame than output/capacity raising strategies. In 
addition current deficit/overall borrowing requirement reduction are
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substantially more significant in the balance than in the output/capacity 
enhancement aspect of macro management. (However, the reduction must be real 
- delaying payments or converting subsidies into public or private enterprise 
deficits covered by bank borrowing does reduce recorded budgetary 
deficits/borrowing but not overall resource imbalances. It is a way of 
hiding, not dealing with, imbalance and is, most unfortunately, one encouraged 
by the particular form, time frame and rigidity of IMF Agreement "trigger 
clauses".)
Macro Economic Balance and Levels - External
At least in the budgetary context, macro economic external management has 
tended to focus on balance (current account deficit levels and financing) 
rather more than on levels (earned import capacity expansion). Clearly levels 
of government spending - and especially of public sector investment whose 
import content is not fully financed by external grants or soft loans - do 
have an impact on imports and ceteris paribus (i.e. holding exports constant) 
the current account deficit. Similarly to the extent that domestic borrowing 
sustains higher levels of spending than would otherwise take place and/or 
substitutes for external finance of the direct and indirect import content of 
public sector investment it does increase the CAD and reduce the sustainable 
level of CAD (whether the source is bank borrowing or otherwise).
Beyond that the relationship of government spending and borrowing to the CAD 
is much less clear cut and simple than is sometimes argued. Government 
recurrent expenditure is not, in general particularly import intensive. 
Private amenity consumption and investment is usually substantially more 
import intensive than health, education and extension services or rural public 
works.
A related macro-management question is external borrowing. The current 20-40$ 
external debt debt service to exports ratios of most SSA economies greatly 
exacerbate external balance management. Future external debt management must 
both seek to reduce them and to finance large enough CADs to allow 
stabilisation and recovery faster than can be achieved through export 
expansion/import substitution. Because in SSA virtually all medium and long 
term (and much short term) external debt is either public sector or government
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guaranteed, external debt management is directly linked to budgetary 
management.
The supply/demand levels side of external macro economic management poses 
particular challenges to SSA budgetary management. Macro budgetary impact on 
exports has tended to be negative for at least a decade and a half more than 
offsetting specific budgetary and other policies intended to raise exports. 
The reasons relate to overvalued exchange rates and domestic market conditions 
much more conducive to secure profits than exports at least partly created by 
macro and micro budgetary and budget linked policies and to lack of adequate 
counterbalancing export incentives (whether of a cost reduction or revenue 
enhancement type). Similarly import substitution particularly in food, energy 
and capital goods (including construction materials and spares) has not been 
proceeding rapidly (in many cases at all) judging by import to output ratios 
nationally and sectorally. How much of this relates to macro and how much to 
micro budgetary policy and practice is unclear, but the record is, in general, 
so weak as to make the quest for more effective management instruments (which 
may relate to knowledge and infrastructure or to reallocation of imports as 
much as or more than to price or subsidy policies) urgent.
This macro management issue is independent of the "expert led growth" debate. 
At present most SSA economies are constrained both as to capacity expansion 
and as to capacity utilisation by inadequate import capacity. The need to 
restore and expand earned import capacity (exports) is clear. Because export 
prospects are not particularly bright, there is a parallel need to reduce the 
required ratio of imports to domestic output with food, fuel, construction 
materials, engineering products, intermediate manufacturing inputs the most 
common key sectors (especially where consumer goods manufacturing is already 
fairly firmly established on a broad front).
Sectoral Makeup and Balance
Macro economic management by itself is inadequate. The makeup of budgetary 
sources and uses is as critical as its overall level.
On the expenditure side the recurrent/fixed capital balance issue has already 
been cited. Further issues arise in respect to levels (and intra sectoral
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balance within them) of education, health, water, research and extension, 
public administration, security, economic infrastructure operation, debt 
service, production incentives (including tax concessions treated as analagous 
to equal subsidy expenditure), consumption transfer payments. Each of these 
has distinct economic effects of its own on present and future production, 
capacity to produce and demand. Equally the balance among them (especially 
for expenditure sectors which contribute to making possible, raising
productivity in or lowering costs of production) i.e. better health and access 
to pure water and education are valuable to agricultural production but 
without operational transport infrastructure and access to inputs (which may 
or may not require input subsidies) are likely to be distinctly less than cost 
efficient in that respect.
Similarly within most sectors severe imbalances exist. Real budgetary cuts 
have made actual levels of operating inputs too low relative both to fixed
capital and to personnel. The attempts to balance by skimping on maintenance 
and cutting real wages/salaries compound the resulting inefficiencies. Within 
sectors some managerial means to improve efficiency exist - both new fixed 
capital formation and some administrative overheads could usefully be pruned 
to allow partial operating input maintenance and real wage level restoration 
while continued increases in establishments parallel to inability to use 
existing personnel fully requires, at the least, critical reexamination. 
However, part of the shift must be intra-sectoral. Pure administration and 
security expenditures are both harder to evaluate and to cut than most heads - 
both now appear in many cases to be too large relative to other sectors.
Similarly many (not necessarily all) producer and consumer subsidies look to 
be less efficient ways of increasing/sustaining production or living standards 
than other public expenditure heads including, e.g. health and economic 
infrastructure maintenance. Which shifts are needed is a contextual question, 
e.g. drought relief food (or food for work infrastructure creation) may be
efficient expenditure while urban food subsidies in the context of limited 
supplies available at those prices relative to urban target groups and radical 
curtailment of basic rural services may be very inefficient expenditure.
The export/import substitution managerial concern cited at macro level also 
applies at sectoral - albeit perhaps less than at macro and micro. e.g. 
energy pricing, taxation, investment and knowledge creation/production 
promotion (e.g. for firewood and charcoal) are sectoral policy issues linked
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to the budget and to efficient import substitution.
On the revenue side differential taxation by sector always requires ongoing 
examination from a managerial viewpoint. High taxes on exports (agricultural 
or other) make sense only if there is an economic surplus to be captured with 
little production disincentive - not now the case for most SSA exports. Low 
taxes on export earnings may be less effective than preferential foreign 
exchange allocations, provision of cost reducing training or infrastructure or 
exchange rate adjustment in stimulating exports. High taxes on fuel (high 
logically means above full cost of transport infrastructure provided which 
suggests road motor vehicle fuel and purchase tax and licence rates are as 
often low as high) do reduce energy import requirements and - in the case of 
gasoline - fall on an amenity consumer good. But they also fall 
disproportionately on distinct rural (and urban) areas and are remarkably 
inflationary because they are passed on (with cost plus markups) throughout 
the economy. No general judgement can be passed but sectoral rate differences 
need regular examination in terms of their continued managerial efficiency in 
respect to production, demand and inflation. (General progressivity questions 
- including differential rates of indirect taxes - are rather different. 
However, deviations in protective tariffs - measured in relation to domestic 
value added, not import cost - do need regular re justification for the same 
reasons as major sectoral divergencies.)
Macro Impact
While the budgetary process in general is a rather blunt instrument for 
achieving micro (single product, enterprise or individual) impact this is not 
necessarily the case of all aspects to that process either as to intent or as 
to unintended impact. For example an additional profits tax on net cash flow 
over 25Í of invested capital in mining enterprises may be an efficient 
instrument to tax a particular enterprise whereas a general sales tax rate of 
75% on clothing accessories may have a major unintended (and undesired) impact 
on a manufacturer of safety gauntlets.
In the case of very large (relative to GDP or exports or tax revenue) units 
direct budgeting attention is managerially necessary. The same applies to 
particularly significant products - e.g. staple foods, fuel. The more general
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problem, however, is anticipating (and if appropriate forestalling or 
alleviating) unintended micro consequences of more general expenditure or 
revenue measures.
Again the issues are likely to be contextual. e.g. if prices for drought 
resistant crops are raised across the board a general sectoral issue arises if 
good harvest year commercial sales are negligible, storage costs high and the 
average time from purchases to droughts in excess of one year - a problem 
exacerbated if the success in encouraging greater production of these crops is 
high. If in addition in a specific region which already has a surplus of 
these crops, in which they ’compete* with a major export and in which the 
price change is paralleled by a knowledge breakthrough (e..g high yielding 
cassava cultivar) a specific micro problem is likely. First, export 
production will decline. Second, food security will not be enhanced 
appreciably. Third, both the export and the drought resistant crop marketing 
cost burdens on the budget will rise (higher unit costs because of a volume 
decrease in the first case and higher loss making throughput in the second). 
Either more selective application of the drought resistant crop price
increases or a parallel increase in the export crops price or both would be 
among the instruments for micro management available to limit these
unintended/undesired consequences.
Distribution and Redistribution
Pulic revenue and expenditure distribute and (barring very unlikely 
assumptions) redistribute. However, they do so in a variety of ways which 
have differential impact both on beneficiaries, size of benefits and net 
impact on production.
Expenditure by itself distributes rather than redistributes. However, because 
use of public services is rarely precisely equal to taxes/fees paid it 
normally redistributes when taken together with the revenue raising side of 
the budget.
In general - but not in respect to any and all measures - redistribution to
below average income recipients can be shown to have an arguable economic and
a strong social case. Within it three types can be distinguished:
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a. primary redistribution which increases recipients' ability to produce 
(earn income) through enhanced access to (including ownership of) 
productive assets;
b. secondary redistribution which increases both potential productive power 
and welfare through provision of "human resource" services, e.g. health, 
education, pure water;
c. tertiary redistribution which comprises pure consumption transfers.
In each category recipients may be above not below average income, e.g. credit 
and extension services usually go disproportionately to above average rural 
income households; higher education ex ante is skewed to children of above 
average education (and income) households and ex post places its recipient in 
an upper income category; government housing subsidies are usually 
concentrated on upper income civil servants. Similarly within each category 
some uses are relatively cost efficient in increasing beneficiary welfare and 
some are not. However in general three points can be made:
First, primary and secondary redistribution are likely to be more economically 
efficient because they can have positive output impact (indeed may be 
justified on that ground alone). Second, tertiary redistribution to above 
average income groups is hard to justify. Third, achieving greater equality 
via public policy in a context of falling real output and income per capita is 
at best a loss reduction exercise. Especially in SSA the poor need higher 
real earned incomes and more public services rather more than less inequality. 
The case for redistribution from a strictly economic perspective is that in
poor countries basic primary and secondary redistribution cannot usually be 
financed without limiting expenditure particularly beneficial to upper income 
groups (unless it has very high production gains directly or via tax revenue 
benefitting the poor) and adopting a progressive tax system.
Other distributional/redistributional issues include sectoral (noted above), 
rural/urban (which overlaps but is not identical to the lower/upper income
division), geographic (specific location) and functional (i.e. rent, profit, 
labour income). The last is probably not a manageable approach in SSA except 
in respect to taxation of "natural resource rents" (e.g. high profits in
diamond mining or petroleum production) where the tax cannot be shifted to
domestic users. First the definition of income for functional purposes does
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no t correspond to workable tax categories (e.g. much of the ’profit’ of small 
enterprises is really labour income of owners, property rentals largely relate 
to improvements and are thus a return on capital); second rent and profit 
taxes can often be shifted to purchasers; third progressive income and 
consumption taxes are in practice (even if not necessarily in theory) more 
effective at taxing the bulk of profit and rental incomes than special taxes 
targeted on rent or unincorporated enterprise profits.
One problem in managing distribution/redistribution in the SSA budgetary 
process is lack of even approximate data on incidence of direct and indirect 
benefits from expenditure. This is not insuperable - systematic examination 
and a working contextual knowledge plus a limited number of sample surveys and 
of census questions could provide a data base - but it has rarely been given 
priority even in countries seriously pursuing redistributive policies and 
using the budget for that purpose.
Efficiency of Expenditure and Revenue Raising
Efficiency is not a concept independent of a goal. Efficiency is necessarily 
in relation to a target or objective. Several different efficiencies are 
relevant to public spending:
a. cost control - i.e. keeping actual expenditure close to that initially
budgeted while getting the specific programme or project carried out. 
Other things being equal holding down the cost of achieving a defined 
task is efficient because it saves on the use of scarce real resources;
b. value for money in respect to inputs i.e. ensuring that all expenditure
is efficient in the quantity of relevant inputs secured. An example of
increasing efficiency in this sense is the substitution of a limited 
array of generic for a wider range of brand name pharmaceuticals;
c. value for money in terms of specified outputs i.e. organising expenditure
to ensure that any given level results in as great a ’production' of the
specified (in quality as well as quantity terms) output as possible;
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d. value for money in goal achievement i.e. ensuring that the formal output 
quality, quantity and mix are efficient in achieving the goals they are 
supposed to serve. e.g. in many SSA economies agricultural research has 
relatively large financial and personnel allocations and in some formal 
sense a fairly high output of activities carrried out. However it 
notably does not provide adequate flows of local condition tested, user 
economic viability (or even national economic viability) tested and 
peasant useability tested knowledge nor interact coherently with either 
agricultural education or agricultural extension. Therefore, in terms of 
real objectives it is not efficient.
Administrative Functionality •
A standard mistake in economic policy and instrument design is failure to 
consider administrative considerations. This leads to systems which are too 
complex and require too many discretionary decisions to be administered 
effectively, promptly or even as intended.
A classic example was an automobile annual registration tax keyed to engine 
capacity, initial cost and age. It was intended to yield revenue, deter 
purchase of fuel intensive or expensive cars and reward careful maintenance 
(leading to long life). Whether an annual registration tax was likely to be 
large enough to be very effective in providing such incentives was open to 
question. What was not in question was that determining the licence fee 
required tedious examination of scarce records and complex calculations which 
drove the insurance company (required to issue the licence jointly with 
compulsory third party cover) to the verge of administrative breakdown and 
caused a major lag in licence/insurance issuance and revenue recovery. The 
tax was streamlined to a lower numBer of rates on the same categories as the 
insurance cover and thus handleable as another column on the same form. While 
the complex incentive effects (if any) may have been weakened, cost of 
collection fell sharply, licenses and insurance were brought up to date and 
both speed of payment and volume of collections increased markedly.
The lesson is that simplicity, clarity and relative ease of handling (whether 
on revenue or expenditure side) are important. Complex procedures are 
unlikely to be fully understood or to be carried out promptly or accurately.
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A second consideration is formulations which limit the possibility of 
avoidance or evasion on the revenue side and of unintended or fraudulent 
claims on the expenditure side. This may mean basic wording more restrictive 
than intended plus a clear list of exceptions (but one short enough so both 
officers and payers/claimants do examine and understand it).
These two administrative desiderata may limit flexibility. While this can be 
’cured’ by discretionary provisions, discretion needs either to be limited in 
probable number of cases (in which case it can be exercised at a ’high’ level 
with time for serious case by case review) or to be bounded by readily 
understandable (to both those seeking and those empowered to grant it) 
guidelines (in which case more decentralised discretion covering longer 
numbers of cases is practicable). The former procedure is appropriate for, 
e.g. major tax concession, the latter for, e.g. operating a rule that in up to 
25% of cases school fees may be waived for children of low income households.
Similar considerations apply to efficiency tests. If these cannot be 
understood and operated by administrators they cannot be made truly 
operational. This is one of the defects of fully articulated and 
conceptualised programme and performance budgeting as opposed to clear and 
comprehensible performance targets/tests such as capital and recurrent costs 
per rural household served by a water scheme or daily hotel keeping (room, 
board, general administration) costs in residential institutions (e.g. 
hospitals, schools).
Managerial and Policy Feasibility
Two major problems arise in trying to relate policy goals to policy 
instruments. One relates to trying to achieve too many goals with one 
instrument with the result that none is served very well. It is not true that 
one instrument is inherently useable for only one goal, e.g. universal primary 
education serves equity (male/female, rural/urban), secondary redistribution 
and production enhancement goals and a differential sales tax can achieve 
progressivity up to quite high income levels while yielding substantial 
revenue and avoiding excessive complexity of rate structure. On the other 
hand mixing protective and consumption deterrant with progressivity and
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revenue goals in indirect taxes is usually relatively ineffective and leads to 
substantial confusion both as to what is sought and what has been achieved. 
This suggests inter alia that protective tariff schedules separate (at least 
for policy and evaluation - not necessarily for collection) from revenue or 
general foreign exchange saving tariff schedules are desirable from a 
managerial point of view.
A second pattern arises from supposing either that all goals are mutually 
independent, complementary or competitive (involving tradeoffs to achieve the 
most acceptable balance among goals possibly by using different instruments 
for each goal even though this results in partial cross-cancellation) or in 
failing to identify what - if any - significant relationships (complementary 
or competitive) actually do exist.
The end result of this problem is likely to be lack of clarity as to targets, 
relationship between targets and instruments and even greater lack of clarity 
as to results or the efficiency (including opportunity cost of limiting 
attainement of other goals) with which they have been achieved. The result is 
the operation and continuation of patterns which hardly seem managerially or 
administratively plausible.
e.g one SSA economy cut mass vaccination/immunisation of children 90$ within a 
(foreign exchange constrained) 50$ cut in expenditure on drugs. Given the 
demonstrable high cost efficiency of the programmes in respect to both 
morbidity and mortality the disproportionate cut seems unlikely to have been 
an efficient adaptation to any constraint.
Further substitution of generic for branded drugs and limiting purchases to a 
limited basic drug list (for which medically analysed prototypes exist) could 
probably have saved at least ten times as much foreign exchange as the 
vaccination/immunisation curtailment.
e.g in one case a high indirect tax on sugar was paralleled by a general 
subsidy to sugar producers. No evident purpose was served by this partial
cross cancelling - either higher consumer prices (with the increase going to
the grower) or a reduction in the indirect tax rate (to the producers’ not the
consumers’ benefit) would appear to have been an improvement on the status
quo.
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Operating the budgetary process as an explicit multi goal managerial 
instrument does not require primarily new or increased numbers of instruments 
but rather using and evaluating them differently:
a. specifying managerial targets in advance in attainable and measureable 
form;
b. working out the consequences of policy and instrument combinations before
they are put into operation. e.g. one SSA economy recreated district 
co-ops to perform certain functions previously handled by centralised 
marketing bodies. To ensure the incentive effect of grower prices it set 
these net of all co-op or marketing body costs. To allow flexibility and 
autonomy to co-ops it gave them the power (subject to rather perfunctory 
scrutiny by a non-managerial, non-economic body) to determine their own 
budgets (and therefore unit costs). No target expenditure reductions 
(much less means to enforce them) were set for marketing bodies losing 
functions. The net effect is fairly certain to be an increase in
marketing costs met for domestic market crops by higher prices, losses 
disguised as working capital borrowing and/or Treasury subsidies and for 
domestic crops either the disguised losses, the subsidies or both. This 
despite a two year phasing in of the co-ops to facilitate forward
planning suggests remarkable lack of coordination among concerned bodies 
and a failure to apply any kind of managerial tests;
c. coordination of actions to ensure consistency and efficiency of results -
a requirement the cost of whose absence is illustrated by the previous
example. (Coordination need not mean that all related actions are taken 
by the same body; the budgetary process is one which has powers to 
enforce coordination and consistency without erecting an ’imperial 
Treasury’.);
d. an ongoing evaluation of actual results and the efficiency with which 
they have been achieved against initial targets and efficiency estimates 
with a view to identifying causes of deviations in order to reverse (or 
minimise) negative ones and capitalise on/expand positive ones.
Achieving these targets - like any other targets - requires skilled personnel
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and time both of whioh are scarce. Therefore it is critical to identify which 
policies, instruments, targets, revenue and expenditure items are most 
critical and thus should have priority in deploying managerial resources. It 
is also necessary to devise approximations and shortcuts which (however 
incomplete or theoretically over-simplified) do give approximately correct 
projections, evaluations and alternatives in time to be of use in decision 
taking and implementation. Precisely wrong data or correct data two months 
after an erroneous decision was taken on no data are managerially very 
inferior to timely, roughly correct approximations.
Sensible - even if somewhat simplistic - rules of thumb have a good deal to be
said for them as management tools so long as they are not turned into 
immutable tablets of stone and so long as the more complex considerations for 
which they are approximations are kept in the institutional memory of those 
using them. Three examples relevant to the budgetary process are:
1. maintaining at least a balance between recurrent revenue and recurrent 
expenditure preferably with a surplus toward debt amortisation and/or 
fixed capital formation;
2. holding the government budget allocation within a bank credit ceiling set 
in terms of accommodating real output growth and exogenous price 
increases but not itself generating inflation at the increase required in 
currency circulation plus a definite proportion (which will be 
contextually related to the share of public sector in total investment 
and to how much public enterprise capital finance is channelled through 
the government budget) of commercial bank domestic credit formation;
3. setting total road user levies (fuel and vehicle taxes, vehicle
registration and licenses) at levels broadly covering cash flow costs of 
road - bridge - ferry operation, maintenance and construction preferably 
with additional levies on saloon cars and at least premium gasoline to 
take account of their nature as amenity consumer goods.
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Concluding Reflections
Treating the budgetary process as a means to economic management broadly 
defined requires explicit attention to targets and their coordination, to 
results and their divergence from targets, to efficiency and to causal
relationships. Using the budget and budgetary process as management tools is 
not in any normal sense ideological. Failure to evaluate results, waste of 
resources and lack of coordination are no more virtues in the context of a 
transition to socialism than of a transition to neo-liberalism. What is true 
is that management serves ends which are political economic and therefore in 
part ideological. Thus any actual managerial process will be in an 
ideological content. Trade offs among goals and the efficiency of certain
results in respect to goals will be evaluated differently - the need to 
project and evaluate them is not however significantly changed.
However an economic management approach to the government budgetary process
does require fairly significant changes in outlook and organisation:
a. perceiving economic management (and not simply economic analysis) as 
central to the budgetary process (and not simply the Budget Speech);
b. creating capacity for analysis, coordination, evaluation from a 
managerial perspective in the central unit (or units) responsible for the 
budgetary process and ensuring that that capacity is located and 
perceived in such a way as to have substantial access to and influence on 
decision takers and implementers;
c. creating managerial cadres in implementing bodies (nothing after all is 
more diffuse in implementation than the budgetary process even though key 
initial decisions are - or can be - highly coordinated) so that the 
central managerial perspective is not encapsulated in a void so far as 
operationality is concerned (in some cases the hardest requirement - 
Treasuries and Ministers of Finance are far more likely to be 
managerially oriented than middle level administrators and specialist 
professionals in other ministries - or even public enterprises);
d. either uniting the key central agencies - Finance, Economic Affairs, 
Development Planning - responsible for overall economic management in one
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relatively harmonious ministry/agency or creating a genuinely ongoing 
coordinated evaluation - proposal making - implementation - evaluation 
process among them. (There is no magic about a single ministry but in 
practice the Budgetary Process and the Treasury are central and are more 
likely to relate to managerial and analytical expertise from within their 
own ministry.)
